| Name of Speaker | Kimon Drakopoulos |
| Schedule | 8 March 2024, 10am – 11.30am |
| Venue | BIZ1- 0206 |
| Link to Register | https://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZ0scuyqrT4vGtDnHl1AToXlPUExri0y7Suq |
| Title | Blockchain Mediated Persuasion |
| Abstract | An ex-post informed Sender wishes to persuade a rational Bayesian Receiver to take a desired action, as in the classic Bayesian Persuasion model studied by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). However, we consider settings in which Sender cannot reliably commit to a signal mechanism. An alternative approach is to consider a trustworthy mediator that receives a reported state of the world from Sender and then, based on this report, generates a signal realization for Receiver. Such mediation can be implemented via costly blockchain technology. Surprisingly, we show that this cost differentiated mediation succeeds where free mediation fails. By requiring Sender to pay the mediator for different signal realizations, we can effectively incentivize them to truthfully report, which in turn allows for beneficial persuasion to take place. Joint with Justin Mulvany, Irene Lo |
| About the Speaker | Kimon Drakopoulos is an Associate Professor in Business Administration at the Data Sciences and Operations department at the USC Marshall School of Business. His research focuses on the operations of complex networked systems, social networks, stochastic modeling, game theory and information economics. Kimon is currently serving in the high level advisory committee to the Greek government on AI regulation and implementation. In 2020 he served as the Chief Data Scientist of the Greek National COVID-19 Scientific taskforce and a Data Science and Operations Advisor to the Greek Prime Minister. He has been awarded the Wagner Prize for Excellence in Applied Analytics and the Pierskalla Award for contributions to Healthcare Analytics. |
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