| Name of speaker | S. Alex Yang |
| Schedule | 22 September 2023, 10am – 11.30am |
| Venue | I4-01-03 Seminar Room |
| Registration | https://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZ0sdOCuqzkoGNS7Zb8Byg3Kg8GrkOoxwvH8 |
| Title of talk | Crowd-judging on Two-sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-group Bias |
| Abstract | Disputes over transactions on two-sided platforms are common and usually arbitrated through platforms’ customer service departments or third-party service providers. This paper studies crowd-judging, a novel crowd-sourcing mechanism whereby users (buyers and sellers) volunteer as jurors to decide disputes arising from the platform. Using a rich dataset from the dispute resolution center at Taobao, a leading Chinese e-commerce platform, we aim to understand this innovation and propose and analyze potential operational improvements, with a focus on in-group bias (buyer jurors favor the buyer, likewise for sellers). Platform users, especially sellers, share the perception that in-group bias is prevalent and systematically sways case outcomes as the majority of users on such platforms are buyers, undermining the legitimacy of crowd-judging. Our empirical findings suggest that such concern is not completely unfounded: on average, a seller juror is approximately 10% likelier (than a buyer juror) to vote for a seller. Such bias is aggravated among cases that are decided by a thin margin, and when jurors perceive that their in-group’s interests are threatened. However, the bias diminishes as jurors gain experience: a user’s bias reduces by nearly 95% as their experience grows from zero to the sample-median level. Incorporating these findings and juror participation dynamics in a simulation study, the paper delivers three managerial insights. First, under the existing voting policy, in-group bias influences the outcomes of no more than 2% of cases. Second, simply increasing crowd size, either through a larger case panel or aggressively recruiting new jurors, may not be efficient in reducing the adverse effect of in-group bias. Finally, policies that allocate cases dynamically could simultaneously mitigate the impact of in-group bias and nurture a more sustainable juror pool.
Link to paper: https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4818 |
| About the speaker | S. Alex Yang is an Associate Professor of Management Science and Operations at London Business School. Alex holds a PhD and an MBA from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, an MS from Northwestern University, and a BS from Tsinghua University. Alex’s primary research focus is on the interface of operations management and finance, especially in trade credit, supply chain finance, and FinTech. His recent research focuses on platform governance and operations and value chain management and innovation. Alex’s research has appeared in academic journals in operations and finance, such as Management Science, M&SOM, and Journal of Financial Economics, and has received several best paper awards. He is the associate editor of several academic journals. An award-winning teacher, Alex has taught on the MBA, EMBA, and executive education programmes in universities and business schools around the world. Beyond research and teaching, Alex has working and consulting experience in banks, Fintech and technology companies, hedge funds, airlines, and international organizations.
https://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty-profiles/y/yang-s |
