Luyi YANG is an assistant professor in the Operations and Information Technology Management Group at the University of California, Berkeley’s Haas School of Business. His research interests include service operations, business model innovation, digital marketplaces, smart mobility, sustainability, and operations-marketing interface. His research is published or forthcoming in leading journals such as Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management and recognized by various research awards such as M&SOM Service Management SIG Best Paper Award, INFORMS Service Science Best Cluster Paper Award, INFORMS Minority Issues Forum Paper Competition, and INFORMS Junior Faculty Interest Group (JFIG) Forum Paper Competition (Honorable Mention). He has taught courses in business analytics, data mining, and operations management. Prior to joining Berkeley Haas, he was an assistant professor of operations management and business analytics at Johns Hopkins University’s Carey Business School. He received his Ph.D. and MBA from the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, and his BS in Industrial Engineering and BA in English, both from Tsinghua University.
| Name of speaker | Luyi Yang |
| Schedule | 25 March 2022, 10am – 11.30am |
| Link to register (via Zoom) | https://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZMuf-yppzwoGtRzBFsorYVikmPRtPTr8Ac6 |
| Title of talk | Right to Repair: Pricing, Welfare, and Environmental Implications |
| Abstract | The “right to repair” (RTR) movement calls for government legislation that requires manufacturers to provide repair information, tools, and parts so that consumers can independently repair their own products with more ease. The initiative has gained global traction in recent years. Repair advocates argue that such legislation would break manufacturers’ monopoly on the repair market and benefit consumers. They further contend that it would reduce the environmental impact by reducing e-waste and new production. Yet, the RTR legislation may also trigger a price response in the product market as manufacturers try to mitigate the profit loss. This paper employs an analytical model to study the pricing, welfare, and environmental implications of RTR. We find that as the RTR legislation continually lowers the independent repair cost, manufacturers may initially cut the new product price and then raise it. This non-monotone price adjustment may further induce a non-monotone change in consumer surplus, social welfare, and environmental impact. Strikingly, the RTR legislation can potentially lead to a “lose-lose-lose” outcome that compromises manufacturer profit, reduces consumer surplus, and increases the environmental impact, despite repair being made easier and more affordable. |
