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X-WR-CALNAME:IORA - Institute of Operations Research and Analytics
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for IORA - Institute of Operations Research and Analytics
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DTSTART:20240101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250307T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250307T113000
DTSTAMP:20260417T204925
CREATED:20250228T032545Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250228T032545Z
UID:25858-1741341600-1741347000@iora.nus.edu.sg
SUMMARY:DAO-ISEM-IORA Seminar Series : Nam Ho-Nguyen
DESCRIPTION:  \n\n\n\nName of Speaker\nNam Ho-Nguyen\n\n\nSchedule\n7 March 2025\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue \nBIZ1-0302\n\n\nLink to Register \n \nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/LmEAt_ZaTS6N4MlO8pFnbg\n\n\nTitle\nMistake\, Manipulation and Margin Guarantees in Online Strategic Classification\n\n\nAbstract\nWe consider an online strategic classification problem where each arriving agent can manipulate their true feature vector to obtain a positive predicted label\, while incurring a cost that depends on the amount of manipulation. The learner seeks to predict the agent’s true label given access to only the manipulated features. After the learner releases their prediction\, the agent’s true label is revealed. Previous algorithms such as the strategic perceptron guarantee finitely many mistakes under a margin assumption on agents’ true feature vectors. However\, these are not guaranteed to encourage agents to be truthful. Promoting truthfulness is intimately linked to obtaining adequate margin on the predictions\, thus we provide two new algorithms aimed at recovering the maximum margin classifier in the presence of strategic agent behavior. We prove convergence\, finite mistake and finite manipulation guarantees for a variety of agent cost structures. We also provide generalized versions of the strategic perceptron with mistake guarantees for different costs. Our numerical study on real and synthetic data demonstrates that the new algorithms outperform previous ones in terms of margin\, number of manipulation and number of mistakes. \n(This is joint work with Lingqing Shen\, Khanh-Hung Giang-Tran and Fatma Kılınç-Karzan.)\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nNam Ho-Nguyen is a Senior Lecturer in the Discipline of Business Analytics at The University of Sydney Business School. His research focuses on data-driven optimization models and scalable algorithms for decision-making problems under uncertainty. Prior to joining The University of Sydney\, he received his PhD in Operations Research from Carnegie Mellon University\, and was a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He was a past recipient of the INFORMS Optimization Society Young Researchers’ Prize 2022\, and received a Discovery Early Career Researchers Award Fellowship from the Australian Research Council in 2024.\n\n\n\n 
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-isem-iora-seminar-series-nam-ho-nguyen/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250312T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250312T113000
DTSTAMP:20260417T204925
CREATED:20250307T023504Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250307T023504Z
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SUMMARY:DAO-ISEM-IORA Seminar Series : Lim Yun Fong
DESCRIPTION:Name of Speaker\nLim Yun Fong\n\n\nSchedule\n12 March 2025\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue \nBIZ2-0413B\n\n\nLink to Register\nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/WYuc2F2xQmuBpvxASTlXcg\n\n\nTitle\nIntegrating EV Charging and Discharging into Power Grid Through Bilateral Negotiation\n\n\nAbstract\nTo deal with demand uncertainty on a power grid\, a power plant with limited ramping capability can collaborate with an electric vehicle (EV) company. With proper charging and discharging prices\, the EV company voluntarily withdraws electricity from or returns electricity to the power grid in suitable phases. We model the two parties’ interactions as a bargaining game on the prices\, followed by the EV company’s charging and discharging problem and the power plant’s electricity generation problem. To solve this bargaining game\, we propose a novel “Guess and Verify” approach. Specifically\, we first find an optimal solution within a restricted price set in which the two parties’ total cost is minimized\, and then verify its global optimality. Under an equilibrium contract\, we find that the power plant can reduce its expected cost from the collaboration. This is because the EV company fully charges in a low electricity demand phase\, reducing the power plant’s curtailment cost\, and fully discharges to the power grid in a high electricity demand phase\, lowering the power plant’s electricity generation cost. Based on real data\, our numerical experiments suggest that the EV company’s charging and discharging can substantially harmonize the power flow within the grid and save significant cost\, especially when the electricity demand gap across different phases increases or the power plant’s ramping capability decreases. Surprisingly\, the EV company’s percentage cost saving can exceed 100%\, implying that it can make a profit from the collaboration. For the power plant\, the percentage cost saving is 2-7%.\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nYun Fong LIM is Professor of Operations Management at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business\, Singapore Management University (SMU). He has been a Chang Jiang Chair Professor\, Lee Kong Chian Fellow\, MPA Research Fellow\, and NOL Fellow. Yun Fong’s research has appeared in Operations Research\, Management Science\, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management\, and Production and Operations Management. He has delivered keynote and plenary speeches in several international conferences. In addition\, his work has received funding by MOE\, A*STAR\, RGC-HK\, and NNSF\, and media coverage by Financial Times\, The Business Times\, CNA938\, and Channel 8. His current research interests include online retailing (supply chains and fulfillment)\, online platforms (business model innovations)\, sustainable urban systems\, and flexible workforce and resource management. Yun Fong serves as Senior Editor for Production and Operations Management and Associate Editor for Naval Research Logistics. He has placed his PhD students and postdoc to CUHK (Shenzhen)\, USTC\, SUSS\, and ShanghaiTech as well as supervised some DBA students who lead influential firms in China. \nAt SMU\, Yun Fong founded the OM PhD Program. He also served as Academic Director of the Master of Science in Management (MiM) Program in 2020-2023 and played an instrumental role in elevating the program from 83rd to 41st worldwide in the Financial Times Rankings. Yun Fong is a recipient of the SMU Teaching Excellence Innovative Teacher Award. He teaches both undergraduate and postgraduate courses in Operations Management. He has provided consulting service and executive development to corporations such as Alibaba\, Maersk\, McMaster-Carr Company\, Resorts World Sentosa\, Schneider Electrics\, Temasek Holdings\, and Zalora. Yun Fong obtained both his PhD and MSc degrees in Industrial and Systems Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-isem-iora-seminar-series-lim-yun-fong/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250314T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250314T113000
DTSTAMP:20260417T204925
CREATED:20250307T023727Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250307T023819Z
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SUMMARY:DAO-ISEM-IORA Seminar Series : Dong Lingxiu
DESCRIPTION:Name of Speaker\nDong Lingxiu\n\n\nSchedule\n14 March 2025\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue \nBIZ1-0302\n\n\nLink to Register\nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/bA-KLhL7Tzibr9SRmbZpGg\n\n\nTitle\nRole of Wellness Valuation Uncertainty and Operational Cost Structure in Product Line Design\n\n\nAbstract\nThe rise of wellness-conscious consumers has led to record demand for products with wellness attributes\, such as low-sugar foods and ultraviolet-protective clothing. This market trend presents a profit-growth opportunity for established companies\, which have dominated the market based on traditional attributes\, such as the taste of food and the appearance of clothing. Yet\, taking advantage of this opportunity is challenging due to the increased operational costs associated with delivering products with wellness attributes and the lack of information on consumers’ valuation of wellness. We present a model of a monopolist developing and producing conventional and wellness products to serve a two-segment market consisting of wellness-conscious and wellness-neutral consumers.  We propose a two-dimensional differentiation-contingency framework to depict the rich set of possible optimal strategies the firm could use to segment the market and explore how the market environment and the firm’s operational environment affect the firm’s choice of the optimal product strategy. We find that while the high expected wellness valuation drives the optimal strategy to be differentiated\, variability in the wellness valuation drives contingency. The contingency dimension is a novel feature in product line design research and enables the firm to hedge its risk of low customer wellness valuation. The firm’s operational cost structure further leads to different prioritization within the wellness product’s quality dimensions: high development cost (resp. high coupling cost between the two quality dimensions) induces prioritization of the traditional (resp. wellness) quality of a wellness product. Examining consumer wellness consumption under the firm’s optimal product strategy offers insights for policy interventions such as consumer educational initiatives and financial incentives to foster innovation.\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nLingxiu Dong is the Frahm Family Chair Professor of Supply Chain\, Operations\, and Technology at the Olin Business School\, Washington University in St. Louis. Her research focuses on supply chain management\, with particular interests in supply chain control and design\, operational flexibility\, and integrated risk management. Her recent work explores technology-enabled innovation\, sustainability\, food and agriculture supply chains\, and the interface of operations and finance.
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-isem-iora-seminar-series-dong-lingxiu/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250321T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20250321T113000
DTSTAMP:20260417T204925
CREATED:20250317T022549Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250317T022549Z
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SUMMARY:DAO-ISEM-IORA Seminar Series: Ling Chun Kai
DESCRIPTION:Name of Speaker\nLing Chun Kai\n\n\nSchedule\n21 March 2025\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue \nBIZ1 – 0302\n\n\nLink to Register\nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/WpZ4beTPQUqSyE-w-DZcPA\n\n\nTitle\nGame Theory: The Art and Science of Strategy\n\n\nAbstract\nGame Theory has emerged as one of the primary tools for multi-agent decision making\, with applications ranging from expert or even superhuman performance in recreational games (e.g.\, Poker\, Starcraft\, Stratego\, Diplomacy) to optimal scheduling of security patrols. Compared to their single agent counterparts\, the multiagent setting is much richer\, with agents exhibiting strategic behavior such as lying\, coercion\, and collusion. In this talk\, I will first introduce basic game theoretic concepts such as the Nash equilibrium. To illustrate the effectiveness of game theoretic approaches\, a series of real-world applications are examined\, including some recent work on optimal patrolling and contested logistics. Finally\, I will briefly cover some problems I am currently working on\, including potential applications in cybersecurity.\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nChun Kai Ling is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science in NUS. His research is on multiagent systems and computational game theory. He develops methods in machine learning and optimization to problems in security and logistics. He currently works on modeling and solving large games\, featuring multiple players or general-sum utilities. His work on inverse game theory and multi-defender security games were best papers in IJCAI 2018 and GameSec 2023\, 2024. He was awarded the Sung Kah Kay Assistant Professorship in 2024 and NUS development grant from 2022-2024. Prior to joining NUS\, he was a Postdoc at Columbia University working with Christian Kroer and Garud Iyengar. He completed his PhD at Carnegie Mellon University under the supervision of Zico Kolter and Fei Fang.
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-isem-iora-seminar-series-ling-chun-kai/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
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