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X-WR-CALNAME:IORA - Institute of Operations Research and Analytics
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for IORA - Institute of Operations Research and Analytics
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BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Asia/Singapore
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DTSTART:20230101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240308T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240308T113000
DTSTAMP:20260419T132006
CREATED:20240304T031806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240304T031806Z
UID:20807-1709892000-1709897400@iora.nus.edu.sg
SUMMARY:DAO-IORA Seminar Series - Kimon Drakopoulos
DESCRIPTION:Name of Speaker\nKimon Drakopoulos\n\n\nSchedule\n8 March 2024\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue \nBIZ1- 0206\n\n\nLink to Register\nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZ0scuyqrT4vGtDnHl1AToXlPUExri0y7Suq\n\n\nTitle\nBlockchain Mediated Persuasion\n\n\nAbstract\nAn ex-post informed Sender wishes to persuade a rational Bayesian Receiver to take a desired action\, as in the classic Bayesian Persuasion model studied by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). However\, we consider settings in which Sender cannot reliably commit to a signal mechanism. An alternative approach is to consider a trustworthy mediator that receives a reported state of the world from Sender and then\, based on this report\, generates a signal realization for Receiver. Such mediation can be implemented via costly blockchain technology. Surprisingly\, we show that this cost differentiated mediation succeeds where free mediation fails. By requiring Sender to pay the mediator for different signal realizations\, we can effectively incentivize them to truthfully report\, which in turn allows for beneficial persuasion to take place. Joint with Justin Mulvany\, Irene Lo\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nKimon Drakopoulos is an Associate Professor in Business Administration at the Data Sciences and Operations department at the USC Marshall School of Business. His research focuses on the operations of complex networked systems\, social networks\, stochastic modeling\, game theory and information economics. Kimon is currently serving in the high level advisory committee to the Greek government on AI regulation and implementation. In 2020 he served as the Chief Data Scientist of the Greek National COVID-19 Scientific taskforce and a Data Science and Operations Advisor to the Greek Prime Minister. He has been awarded the Wagner Prize for Excellence in Applied Analytics and the Pierskalla Award for contributions to Healthcare Analytics.
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-iora-seminar-series-kimon-drakopoulos/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240311T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240311T113000
DTSTAMP:20260419T132006
CREATED:20240304T032033Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240304T032033Z
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SUMMARY:DAO-IORA Seminar Series - Arnoud den Boer
DESCRIPTION:Name of Speaker\nArnoud den Boer\n\n\nSchedule\n11 March 2024\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue \nBIZ1- 0304\n\n\nLink to Register \n \nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZcrdeytpjgsGtEen4nnptCLRFl85dvfKFvR\n\n\nTitle\nCan price algorithms learn to form a cartel?\n\n\nAbstract\nCan price algorithms learn to form a cartel instead of compete against each other\, potentially leading to higher consumer prices and lower social welfare? The question is controversial among economists and competition policy regulators. One the one hand\, concerns have been expressed that self-learning price algorithms do not only make it easier to form price cartels\, but also that this can be achieved within the boundaries of current antitrust legislation – raising the question whether the existing competition law needs to be adjusted to mitigate undesired algorithmic collusion. On the other hand\, a number of economists believe that algorithms learning to collude is science fiction\, except by using forms of signaling or communication that are already illegal\, and argue that there is no need to change antitrust laws. Motivated by this discussion\, I will present work that shows that under some market conditions\, price algorithms can learn to collude. Based on joint work with Janusz Meylahn\, Thomas Loots\, Maarten Pieter Schinkel\, Ali Aouad.\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nArnoud is Associate Professor at the Korteweg-de Vries Institute for Mathematics of the University of Amsterdam. He studied Mathematics at Utrecht University (2006)\, Mathematics for Industry at Eindhoven University of Technology (2008) and wrote his PhD thesis `Dynamic Pricing and Learning’ (2013) about data-driven price algorithms at the CWI Centrum for Wiskunde and Computer Science in Amsterdam. Arnoud’s research focuses on the interface of learning and optimization\, with applications in dynamic pricing and revenue management. He is the recipient of several awards and grants\, including the 2015 Gijs de Leve prize for best PhD Thesis in operations research defended in the Netherlands in the period 2012-2014\, personal grants from the Dutch Science Foundation\, and the INFORMS Revenue Management & Pricing Section Prize. Arnoud serves as editor for Management Science\, M&SOM\, and POMS\, is board member of the Euro Working Group on Pricing and Revenue Management and board member of the INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Section.
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-iora-seminar-series-arnoud-den-boer/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240313T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240313T113000
DTSTAMP:20260419T132006
CREATED:20240307T031244Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240307T031244Z
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SUMMARY:DAO-IORA Seminar Series - Zhang Fuqiang
DESCRIPTION:  \n\n\n\nName of Speaker\nZhang Fuqiang\n\n\nSchedule\n13 March 2024\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue \nBIZ1-0307\n\n\nLink to Register \n \nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZUvdu2grDItHdZl1LhIH4lgx0-lY42S7eks\n\n\nTitle\nThe Bright Side of Price Volatility in Global Commodity Procurement\n\n\nAbstract\nThis paper studies two competing firms’ choices between the contingent-price contract (CPC) and fixed-price contract (FPC) in global commodity procurement. The FPC price is determined when signing the contract\, whereas the CPC price is pegged to an underlying index and remains open until the delivery date. Under both contracts\, each firm determines its order quantity based on the updated belief about the market demand. The unrealized CPC price correlates with the market demand\, allowing a firm to update its belief about the CPC price using demand information\, thereby generating a price-learning effect. We find that\, contrary to conventional wisdom\, a larger price volatility could benefit the firms\, and\, under differentiated contracts\, a firm might benefit from the improvement of forecast accuracy at its rival. We further show that the price-learning effect plays a critical role in the firms’ contract choices. First\, significant price volatility forces the firms to pursue the responsiveness of the CPC. Second\, the firms may adopt differentiated contracts to enhance their responses to market changes and dampen competition\, and a higher competition intensity more likely leads to contract differentiation. Third\, the firms in a small market seek responsiveness and contract differentiation rather than cost efficiency. This study reveals the bright side of price volatility and takes a step toward understanding the effect of two-dimensional information updating.\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nFuqiang Zhang is the Dan Broida professor of Supply Chain\, Operations\, and Technology (SCOT) at Olin Business School\, Washington University in St. Louis. He also serves as the SCOT area chair and academic director of MBA programs at Olin. Professor Zhang obtained his Ph.D. in Managerial Science and Applied Economics from the Wharton School\, University of Pennsylvania. His research interests focus on supply chain and technology innovation\, consumer analytics in operations management\, and sustainable operations. In recent years\, he has been working on research topics that are driven by empirical data. Professor Zhang’s research has appeared in top-tier academic journals such as Management Science\, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management\, Operations Research\, Marketing Science\, and Production and Operations Management.\n\n\n\n 
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-iora-seminar-series-zhang-fuqiang/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240319T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240319T113000
DTSTAMP:20260419T132006
CREATED:20240311T030605Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240311T030605Z
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SUMMARY:DAO-IORA Seminar Series - Zhu Weiming
DESCRIPTION:  \n\n\n\n\nName of Speaker\nZhu Weiming\n\n\nSchedule\n19 March 2024\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue\nBIZ1-0206\n\n\nLink to Register\nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZcvdu-rpzkuHNTHWtUz_oEaagwlXP1_FVHp\n\n\nTitle\nExtracting Efficiency from Chaos: Rider Behavior\, Performance and Negative Externality in Dockless Bike Sharing Systems\n\n\nAbstract\nIn recent years\, urban bike-sharing systems developed in two main forms: Dock-based systems that rely on fixed location docks to park at and pick up bicycles from\, and Dockless systems which allow users to pick up and drop off bikes anywhere. By eliminating reliance on fixed docks\, dockless systems provide significantly improved mobility and convenience to riders\, yet they have downsides such as high operational costs and occupying valuable sidewalk space. Collaborating with a major dockless bike-sharing platform\, we empirically analyze riders’ economic incentives\, explore the efficiency and measure the negative externality of this business model. Specifically\, we address the following questions: (i) What is the impact of the number of bicycles in the system on efficiency? (ii) How does the efficiency of dockless and dock-based systems compare? (iii) How can bike-share company minimize the negative externalities generated during service provision through smart relocation?\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nWeiming Zhu is an Associate Professor in Innovation and Information Management at HKU Business School. Weiming obtained his bachelor’s degree in Physics from HKUST and Ph.D. in Operations Management from the Robert H. Smith School of Business at University of Maryland. Prior to joining the University of Hong Kong\, he was an Associate Professor in IESE’s Department of Production\, Technology and Operations Management. Weiming has also been a visiting professor in the Institute for Data\, Systems\, and Society (IDSS) at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. Weiming’s research interests include operations in the platform economy\, urban mobility\, and supply chain finance. His work has been published at Management Science\, M&SOM and Journal of International Economics\, and has been recognized in M&SOM\, POMS\, Service Science and CSAMSE best paper award competitions.\n\n\n\n\n 
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-iora-seminar-series-zhu-weiming/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240322T100000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20240322T113000
DTSTAMP:20260419T132006
CREATED:20240315T084423Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240315T084423Z
UID:21570-1711101600-1711107000@iora.nus.edu.sg
SUMMARY:DAO-IORA Seminar Series - Sasa Zorc
DESCRIPTION:  \n\n\n\n\nName of Speaker\nSasa Zorc\n\n\nSchedule\n22 March 2024\, 10am – 11.30am\n\n\nVenue\nBIZ1-0206\n\n\nLink to Register \n \nhttps://nus-sg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZIpce2srDwrHdyCUf-w1Rtdh_3c-YlU9nTz\n\n\nTitle\nSearch with Recall and Gaussian Learning\n\n\nAbstract\nThe classic sequential search problem rewards the decision maker with the highest sampled value\, minus a cost per sample. If the sampling distribution is unknown\, then a Bayesian decision maker faces a complex balance between exploration and exploitation. We solve the stopping problem of sampling from a Normal distribution with unknown mean and unknown variance and a conjugate prior\, a longstanding open problem. The optimal stopping region may be empty (it may be optimal to continue the search regardless of the offer one receives\, especially at the early stages)\, or it may consist of one or two bounded intervals. While a single reservation price cannot describe the optimal rule\, we do find a standardized reservation rule: stop if and only if the standardized value of the current offer is sufficiently high relative to the standardized search cost. We also introduce the index function\, which provides a computationally practical way to implement the standardized stopping rule for any given prior\, sampling history\, and sampling horizon.\n\n\nAbout the Speaker\nSasa Zorc is an assistant professor at the Darden School of Business\, University of Virginia. Sasa obtained his PhD in Management from INSEAD. He studies incentives in multi-agent systems such as health care and matching markets (both centralized and decentralized). Methodologically\, his research relies on stochastic dynamic games\, search theory\, dynamic mechanism design\, contract theory and data-driven simulations.
URL:https://iora.nus.edu.sg/events/dao-iora-seminar-series-sasa-zorc/
CATEGORIES:IORA Seminar Series
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